

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

Dept. of State (NNK-78-27)  
BY Myth NAAS, DATE 3/13/78

ANNEX V

A DOCTRINE TO PRESERVE THE  
INDEPENDENCE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Latin America stands today on the threshold of a decisive phase of a great revolution. Some of its component societies are already astride that threshold; the rest are drawn inexorably toward it.

Peoples and governments throughout the Americas are being caught up in the adventure of creating in this Hemisphere modern societies -- their citizens increasingly literate, their families increasingly well-fed, well-clothed and well-housed; their economies absorbing increasingly what modern science and technology can provide; their political leadership increasingly responsive to the will of an informed and responsible electorate; their relations with each other and with the United States marked by growing mutual respect, dignity, and that sense of partnership appropriate among sovereign states bound by ties of propinquity, history, and a common devotion to the Christian heritage.

Each nation's rate and pattern of modernization is unique. It is determined by factors peculiar to its own culture, tradition, economy, leadership and propensity for progress. Revolutions move forward irregularly and unevenly. The revolutionary currents prevalent throughout Latin America are quickening, however, and no man nor government is likely long to contain them. Those who would survive and guide them into constructive

into constructive channels must be prepared to work with the tide rather than try to stand against it.

Significant constructive change has occurred in the past fifteen years. It can be measured in the rise of literacy, the rise of income, in the declining number of Latin American dictators. These cumulative results provide the stage from which to launch a decade of development. The 1960's must and shall be the crucial decade when most of the states of Latin America demonstrate decisively that economic growth, political democracy, social equity, and stalwart national independence can be built and made mutually reinforcing throughout the Western Hemisphere.

This is our common task.

The Alliance for Progress -- born out of the Declaration of Bogota, and the earlier Brazilian initiative for Operation Pan-America -- is our common instrument. The United States commitment to that Alliance is rooted in, and springs from, the earliest and most fundamental commitments of our national life and political system. The basic truths enunciated at the time our nation was born are not limited to any single nation or group of men. They are universal. We are everywhere committed to the cause of independence, freedom, and progress. We, therefore, recognize and support the efforts of men throughout the rest

of the

of the Americas to progress towards their versions of these goals.

The independence of the Latin American revolution is now clearly threatened.

Intruding on this Hemisphere is a foreign force, a foreign ideology, and a foreign apparatus of conspiracy. Its objective has been clearly and candidly enunciated by Mr. Khrushchev in his speech of January 6, 1960. Those who do not take that statement of policy seriously in the 1960's incur the same risk as those who failed to take Mein Kampf seriously in the 1930's.

The objective of international Communism, as enunciated by Mr. Khrushchev, is to capture and exploit the revolutionary aspirations at work in Latin America, as elsewhere, to seize one nation after another and bring it under Communist control, within the international Communist apparatus. Each Communist Party is a Trojan Horse within the limits of a target nation. Political, economic and cultural instruments are ruthlessly yet skillfully employed for the progressive subversion of non-Communist institutions and political groups. Military tactics range from organized urban disorder to guerrilla warfare encouraged, guided, supplied, and sometimes even led from outside the nation under attack.

Within the

[REDACTED]

Within the Western Hemisphere there now exists a Communist state -- Cuba. What might have been its legitimate political, economic and social revolution has been successfully seized and subverted by international Communism. Step by step in the precise pattern used by the Communists in Eastern Europe after World War II, the whole machinery of political power in Cuba has been brought under control of the Communist apparatus. The military and economic destinies of Cuba have been made so dependent upon the Communist bloc that any exercise of independent or sovereign will by the Cuban government (or the Cuban people) is by now virtually impossible.

The Castro regime poses quite particular threats to Latin America. Before we can deal together with those threats, we must be clear what they are and what they are not. Those threats do not arise from Castro's domestic economic and social policies, although these are not in the interests of a progressive and equitable Cuban society. Those threats do not arise even from the fact that Castro's rule is a police dictatorship -- although its methods are abhorrent and it is in the common interest of this Hemisphere that the recent trend toward democratic government continue in Cuba as elsewhere. The special dangers that justify urgent common action are twofold: (1) the military presence in the Hemisphere

of force

[REDACTED]

of force under the control of international Communism, which could be turned against the direct security interests of the several states of the American community; (2) the unremitting campaign of political aggression against other Latin American states, mounted from Cuba.

It is the potential military danger and the real and present danger of political aggression that justify urgent common action.

There are other dangers to be considered. As the character and objectives of the Castro regime have become clear, its hostility toward and corrosive effect upon the inter-American system have been unmistakable. Decades of constructive endeavor represented by the OAS and other inter-American institutions are today threatened as never before. For their own purposes, Castro and his Communist allies seek to render impotent and to discredit the entire regional system of the Hemisphere. This frontal assault upon the very concept of Pan Americanism can neither be ignored nor avoided.

We must find afresh the common ground on which we stand and build upon it a common program, rooted in our common hopes and common dangers.

Further, by the naked fact of its existence, the Castro regime confuses and jeopardizes the creative aspirations and prospects of the rest of the Hemisphere. Economic development is slowed by political instability. Social development and overdue institutional reform are retarded by an

unwillingness

unwillingness to shake the status quo in the presence of so clear, unpalatable and dangerous an alternative.

Militarily, politically, and economically, Castro's Cuba thus threatens the prospects for progress in the Hemisphere and the old communal heritage we have built. From its present threshold, Latin America's revolution can move forward decisively, along democratic paths; or it can plunge into chaos. Our own actions -- individually and severally in this Hemisphere -- now and throughout the 1960's will determine the outcome.

To preserve the independence of the revolutionary process in Latin America, as well as to defend the national independence of the several states of Latin America, we propose the following courses of action.

Note: This statement is designed to provide not only the foundation for specific propaganda themes set out below, but also a rationale for such programs of common action as we may prove able to generate in the Hemisphere.

ANNEX V A

ANNEX V A

BASIC AND CONTINUING SPECIFIC THEMES  
ON CUBA FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE WORLD AT LARGE

1. THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IS THE LINK BETWEEN THE AUTHENTIC REVOLUTION IN THE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES.

The Alliance for Progress program grew out of the specific suggestions and proposals developed by progressive Latin American leaders, which they incorporated in the Act of Bogota in September 1960. The United States has already appropriated \$500,000,000 as the first step in carrying out the program. All aspects of the program should be publicized as the major concern of the United States in its policy towards Latin America. It should be emphasized that the reforms planned in this program all can be achieved in the framework of democratic societies without the loss of freedom required by the Communist model, and that, unfortunately, Castro has chosen to isolate Cuba from the cooperative development plans the Alliance will undertake.

2. LATIN AMERICA HAS MADE GREAT PROGRESS WITHOUT COMMUNISM:

The social and economic problems in Latin America are being solved today in many states in the area. Argentina, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, to mention some specific examples, are making and have made economic, social, and political progress. The Mexican revolution is an example of the great revolutionary transformation in Latin

[REDACTED]

in Latin America. In Mexico, landless peasants have become landowners, a national industry has been developed, and political democracy is rapidly developing. Uruguay's multiple executive and sub-party system, which enables proportional representation to work without the political chaos that often attends it, is one of the world's outstanding experiments in democratic government. Venezuelan land reform, now in progress, is far more successful than Castro's. These, and other examples, should be publicized as fully as possible to demonstrate that Castro's communism is not only not wanted but not needed in Latin America.

3. CASTRO IS ENGAGED IN WAR ON THE IDEALS AND TRADITIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN LIFE:

Castro's speeches, as well as the pronouncements of his principal lieutenants and the decrees and actions of his regime, show that Castro explicitly renounces the ideals and traditions long cherished by the peoples of Latin America. At the same time, he actively propagates an alien ideology which affronts and violates these cultural, social and political ideals. His contempt for democracy puts him in direct conflict with great Latin American reformers, like Jose Enrique Rodo, who wrote: "the spirit of democracy is for our civilization a principle of life against which it is useless to rebel." In addition, Castro has not only

denounced religion

[REDACTED]



denounced religion, but, in his brutal treatment of political prisoners, has shown contempt for the fundamental humanist traditions of civilization in Latin America.

4. CUBA HAS BECOME MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC; AND HAS LOST ITS INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTY.

The transformation of Cuba from a country friendly towards the Bloc, to a client state, to an integral unit of the Communist military and economic system should be emphasized. Cuba has received more Communist armament than any other non-Bloc country, in the process of this transformation. In this process, also, Cuba appears about to become the chief non-Bloc trading partner of the Soviet Union. Not only has Cuba become completely dependent on Bloc military and economic assistance, but hundreds of Bloc technicians have come to Cuba to supervise the use to which this aid is put. Cuban sugar is bought by the Bloc at a lower price than in the past and dumped on the world market. Using the most current available statistics on Bloc military and economic assistance, not only the nature of this transformation but also its significance for the Western Hemisphere and the world can be demonstrated. Castro's military forces are now an adjunct of Communist military power that threatens all the republics of Latin America, but especially, the small and nearby states of the Caribbean area. Cuba's total economic dependence on

[REDACTED]

dependence on the Bloc makes Cuba a potentially disruptive element in the integrated economic development programs planned by the American States.

5. CASTRO'S GOVERNMENT IS A TOTALITARIAN TYRANNY.

Castro is not a dictator in the conventional Latin American sense. All aspects of society in Cuba are now effectively controlled by totalitarian tyranny and terror, as dramatically revealed by the way the system of neighborhood police informers was used to round up en masse entire families and whole communities during the recent invasion. In addition to reiterating the examples of repression, terror, thought control, disregard for justice, and other manifestations of totalitarian control in Cuba by a disciplined Communist cadre, the Castro dictatorship should be linked to the methods employed by Communists in Eastern Europe, in Russia, and in Communist China. Excepting Trujillo, he should not be linked to Latin American dictators.

6. A SMALL COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATUS HAS SEIZED COMPLETE POLITICAL CONTROL IN CUBA.

The Popular Socialist Party (the Cuban Communist Party) is the only legal political party in Cuba. This small disciplined group, augmented by non-Cuban Communist cadremen, controls all aspects of state power

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-11-

state power in Cuba. This includes, in addition to the departments of government, the army and the police, the labor unions, the press, radio and television, the schools and even the movie industry. The revolution of Castro, in other words, has been captured by Communism. For some time, efforts were made to conceal this capture, but on 1 May 1961, it was officially proclaimed throughout the country that "Cuba marches under the banner of socialism" -- the political slogan of Communism.

7. CUBA IS INTEGRATED INTO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL APPARATUS.

Cuba has an important role in the plans of the Sino-Soviet Bloc for the Western Hemisphere. Communist front conferences, such as the youth congress of July 1960, and the subsequent women's conference, agrarian conference and similar planned future events, indicate that Havana is now the Communist conference capital of the Western Hemisphere. Soviet officials, from Khrushchev down, have gone to great lengths to demonstrate their closeness to Cuba. Cuban officials received major attention in Moscow at such functions as the meeting of the eighty-one Communist parties in November 1960. Havana, also, is the center of organization, as well as distribution, for Communist propaganda, international Communist espionage, and for the documentation of illegal travellers to Latin American countries that forbid legal Communist party activity.

8. CUBA IS ENGAGED IN THE SUBVERSION OF LATIN AMERICA.

Castro began "filibustering" adventures in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and elsewhere in the Caribbean area at the outset of his rule in 1959. In the final weeks of April 1961, landings of Cuban saboteurs were reported in Venezuela and Haiti, and there are copious examples of Cuban subversion in Latin America between these dates. Moreover, Cuba has become a Communist military entity in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba's armament exceeds that of any other state in Latin America. This, combined with the examples of sabotage, espionage, and propaganda activity of Cuban agents, and the training in Cuba of guerrilla forces comprised of nationals of other Latin American countries, demonstrates the dimensions of the threat Castro poses to Hemisphere security.

9. CASTRO HAS FAILED TO SOLVE CUBA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

Castro has failed to carry out his promise to give land to the landless. In July 1960, after a year and a half of publicizing the program by every means of mass communication, only 3,000 land titles had actually been transferred to landless peasants. Subsequently, Castro has emphasized Chinese commune style agrarian measures. Real wages of urban workers and sugar mill hands have fallen, not only because of inflation but


[REDACTED]

inflation but because of the deliberate action of the government, which now controls and pays the wages of these nationalized workers. For example, the incentive pay of sugar mill workers was recently cut forty-five percent. Castro and his propagandists admit to large-scale shortages of basic goods in their frequent exhortations to the Cuban people. The acuteness of this problem is illustrated by the 7 April broadcast which denounced "those who complain of standing in queues" (because of shortages) as "enemies of the regime." These and all other examples of evidence of Castro's failure to make good his promises to the Cuban people should be used to demonstrate that Castro's Communism provides no solution to the economic problems of the developing nations of Latin America. As in the case of Soviet Russia and Communist China, Castro-Communism concentrates primarily on enhancing the economic power of the state to engage in international aggression and adventure rather than on improving the lives of its citizens.

10. THE UNITED STATES HAS TRADITIONALLY SUPPORTED  
THE MOVEMENT FOR FREEDOM AND COOPERATIVE  
ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA.

The United States has historically been sympathetic to movements for freedom in Latin America, as elsewhere. The United States  
has also long

has also long been the haven for groups of exiles from oppressive regimes. At the same time, the United States has accepted the principle of cooperative action in hemisphere relations, and the principle of non-intervention. Thus, the people of the United States have given sympathetic support to the activities of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, but the United States Government has refrained from direct military action, despite the provocations of the Castro regime. It should be noted, however, that the United States cannot and will not neglect its duty to play a leading role in collective hemispheric defense, as recognized in various inter-American treaties; and it will act forcefully in the face of a direct security threat to the United States.

ANNEX V B  


ANNEX V B

ADDITIONAL THEMES FOR THE AUDIENCE IN CUBA

1. RESISTANCE FORCES CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF CUBA.

Although it is not desirable at this time to incite Cubans to para-military action, it is important that hope be maintained among those who are opposed to Castro. Therefore, measured publicity should be given to all stories that appear, or can be developed, which indicate that a significant resistance force exists in the Escambray Mountains, and elsewhere in Cuba.

2. THE FACTS OF CUBAN LIFE MUST BE GIVEN TO CUBA FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.

The Castro regime controls all media of information within Cuba. Therefore, friends of the Cuban people, outside the country, are obliged to make every effort to ensure that the Cubans are aware of those things the regime wishes to conceal. They should be given specific information concerning the large numbers of Soviet and Chinese technicians that are in Cuba, and told that the role of these technicians is to supervise the Castro government and all its programs. They should be told of the failures in Castro programs, be reminded of shortages in basic commodities, of atrocities

of atrocities committed by the regime, and of the examples of particular economic hardships in specific areas or among specific groups of Cuban society. They should also be informed of constructive developments in the rest of the Hemisphere.

3. CUBA IS ISOLATED IN LATIN AMERICA.

All statements and other evidence of disapproval of the Castro government emanating from Latin American leaders and governments should be brought to the attention of the Cuban people. They should also be made aware of all evidence that their economic relationships with the Sino-Soviet system operate to the advantage of the Communist Bloc and not to their own; for example, instances of Soviet dumping of Cuban sugar. They should be convinced that Castro has not only severed their ties with their fellow Latin Americans, with whom they share a common cultural background, but that the new alignment with the Communist Bloc makes this isolation increasingly more complete.

4. ALTHOUGH THE CUBAN REVOLUTION HAS BEEN BETRAYED  
REFORMA CON LIBERTAD WILL TRIUMPH IN CUBA.

The promised reforms of Castro, before he attained power, should be repeatedly mentioned and his abandonment of these promised programs emphasized as the betrayal of the revolutionary hopes of Cubans and others in Latin America. Cubans who advocate democratic reforms should



reforms should be given every opportunity to present their views to the Cuban people. They should advocate a program of reform with freedom. Castro's failure to make good his promise of land for the landless should be an essential ingredient of any such proposals. It should be emphasized that a change from Castro would not mean a return to Batista, but a new Cuba, dedicated to democratic reform and progress.

5. CUBAN REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE WELL TREATED, AND THEIR SKILLS ARE BEING DEVELOPED FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN A FREE CUBA.

In these terms, the United States program for Cuban refugees -- whatever it turns out to be -- should be projected.

ANNEX V C  
[REDACTED]

## ANNEX V C

### MEANS OF DISSEMINATION

1. Two general observations on the projection of the suggested themes:

a) Actions will speak louder than words -- notably actions designed to support the Alliance for Progress and common actions in the Hemisphere generated to deal with Communist aggression.

b) The themes will, in general, be effective to the extent that they are projected -- or appear to be projected -- by Latin Americans rather than North Americans. The resources for using Latin American means of communication should be vigorously exploited.

2. Public opinion in four areas must be considered in operations against Castro.

a) The U.S.

b) Cuba

c) The rest of Latin America

d) The rest of the world.

3. The task of communicating -- directly or indirectly -- the rationale behind the operations must be chiefly entrusted to four divisions of the U.S. Government:

a) The White

[REDACTED]

- a) The White House
- b) The Department of State
- c) The United States Information Agency
- d) Central Intelligence Agency

(Other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch may be useful on an ad hoc basis; e.g., Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, the Export-Import Bank. So, from time to time, may Congress, or individual members thereof.)

Additionally, international organizations offer avenues of communication -- the United Nations, the OAS, the Inter-American Bank, NATO.

Something may also be done through the domestic news services and the diplomatic establishments of friendly governments; e.g., Secretary's background briefing of Latin American (and other) diplomats; Embassy officers' explorations to Foreign Ministries; etc.

4. U.S. opinion. The White House and the State Department will be primarily responsible for influencing U.S. opinion about Cuba. (USIA is debarred by statute from operating in the U.S.) At home, and abroad, the President's words carry greatest weight: major pronouncements should be his. After the President, the Secretary of State has most authority.

In addition

[REDACTED]

-20-

In addition, background briefings for press (and other media), domestic and foreign, may be used.

4. Cuba. Cuba today presents an "iron curtain" situation: Castro controls completely all domestic communications media.

VOA short-wave broadcasts (as of April 30, six hours daily: three of originations, three of repeats) do reach Cuba: USIA has evidence that listenership is extensive. A Mexico-originated USIA radio news show, El Mundo en Marcha, has some Cuban listeners: we do not know how many. U.S. medium-wave commercial stations are spottily heard, but atmospheric conditions and the plethora of Cuban stations jamming the dial limit their audience. The signal of Radio Swan is fairly strong outside Habana, but recently there has been interference, which may or may not be conventional jamming. Stations in other Caribbean countries are audible to some extent: the inter-American Broadcasters' Association has plans afoot to increase their Cuban audience. The Guantanamo AFRS station is heard in extreme eastern Cuba.

A plan to televise programs into Cuba from an airplane flying above Key West has been considered by USIA; but no action has thus far been taken because of technical difficulties, treaty obligations, and cost. The

[REDACTED]

cost. The nature of the crisis may warrant reconsideration.

A few U.S. publications still reach Cuba, but their readers among pro-Castro Cubans are presumably few. Aerial pamphlet raids are possible. Cuban newspapers still receive U.S. wire services, and print some factual material (i.e., U.S. Government pronouncements).

6. The Rest of Latin America. With rare exceptions, responsible Latin American communications media are basically friendly (albeit often critical) to the U.S. and her purposes: their reaction to recent events so proves. Thus USIA, operating overtly (and occasionally on an unattributed basis), and CIA, operating covertly as required, have good access to most Latin American media.

Radio Swan is heard throughout the Caribbean.

In addition, these themes can be projected through various non-governmental units: youth and student groups, labor unions, business and fraternal organizations, etc.

Cuban exiles can also be encouraged to tell their story, through appropriate channels, to key target groups in Latin America.

Latin American audiences may also be reached indirectly: most major outlets receive U.S. wire services; ABC, NBC, and CBA have affiliations with many television stations; most movies shown in

Latin America

[REDACTED]

Latin America are U.S.; Latin American newsreel companies buy U.S. footage; American publications -- TIME, Newweek, Vision, LIFE and Life en Espanol, the New York TIMES, The Miami HERALD -- are widely read.

Additionally, USIA reaches millions of Latin Americans directly through its own apparatus: short-wave broadcasts, pamphlets and publications, mobile units, lectures, binational centers, etc. Radio Swan is also being heard throughout the Caribbean.

7. The Rest of the World. The greatest American weakness in dealing with Cuban policy lies outside this Hemisphere. Here a major effort is required.

Except for the Communist world and certain non-Communist countries whose governments are hostile or intensely neutral, foreign audiences may be reached through the direct and indirect channels of communication described above. Placement is, however, more difficult: closer-to-home events normally preoccupy most peoples.

(A greater effort with foreign correspondents stationed in the U.S. is evidently required: their on-the-spot reports during the week of the landings were among the most damaging.)

[REDACTED]